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DEBATES ON EU ENLARGEMENT AND A
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Silke Adam
ABSTRACT
The article investigates why a specific European issue is debated in one country but
disregarded in another, and why issues are debated differently in different European
countries. To understand this national filtering, expectations are formulated as to how
specific policy traditions and issue-specific conflict constellations within a country are
reflected in media debates. A systematic content analysis of the debates on EU
enlargement and a common constitution for the years – in the German and
French quality press reveals considerable variation in issue salience, actors’
prominence and actors’ responsibility attributions between and within the countries.
This variation can be seen to be connected with different policy traditions and conflict
constellations. The study seeks to go beyond merely describing variations in media
coverage across Europe and systematically uses cross-national and cross-issue
comparative research to understand this variation.
Although researchers have underlined the importance of the national media in
publicizing the details of European integration, little is known of the factors
that trigger whether and how the media open up the European debate.
Studying these factors, however, is important for at least two reasons. The
debates on EU integration are first a precondition for the ‘democratization’
of European politics. Up to the Maastricht treaty, a purely output-oriented
type of legitimacy (see for a distinction Scharpf, ) was regarded as
sufficient for the European Union. Now and increasingly researchers stress the
need for European input legitimacy referring to the fit between any decisions
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made and the will of the people (see e.g. Ho¨reth, , p. , Lepsius, ;
p. ). Input legitimacy relies not only on institutional factors, but also on
the communication flows that allow interest mediation and social integration
within Europe (see e.g. Baker, /). Interest mediation is a two-sided
process: information on the positions of political elites allows citizens to
control the political process, and information on societal interests tells
politicians which problems are urgent and which positions are prominent.
Second, studying the factors that trigger European debates in the national
mass media is important since these debates may influence European politics. So
far the success story of European integration has relied on elite-based
compromises reached behind closed doors and based on the citizens’ permissive
consensus. This nonpublic mode of policy-making seems to have reached its
limits as the permissive consensus is in decline and at best is being replaced by a
‘reluctant acceptance’ (Mittag & Wessels, , p. ) or even a rejection—if
one thinks of the referenda in France and the Netherlands regarding the
European Constitution. Public debates might have the potential to change
citizens’ attitudes and to integrate them into a European community. On the
other hand public debates on European issues could change traditional policy-
making within the EU undermining the adjusted processes of decision-making
and compromise finding (Kriesi, , p. ).
Most of the studies that seek not only to describe, but also to explain,
the debates on EU integration in national media have highlighted factors
that account for commonalities between countries. Researchers have shown that
Europe and European actors enter the national media in those issue fields in
which competences have actually been shifted to European levels (Koopmans &
Erbe, , Pfetsch, ). In addition, research shows that European
issues figure in the national media outside routine politics: for example,
summit meetings involving national politicians have significant news value
(e.g. De Vreese, , p. ). Political crises also have ‘conflict’ news value
(Berkel, ). Last but not least, research has shown that specific types of
media open up communication flows dealing with European issues: for
example European issues and actors are more visible in the quality than in
the tabloid press, and in public more than in private television (Kevin, ,
Peter & De Vreese, ; Peter, Lauf, & Semetko, ). While this might
demonstrate some common features in media debates within different European
countries, it does not help us to understand why a specific European issue is
debated in one country but disregarded in another, or why issues are debated
differently in different countries. Peter et al. (Peter & De Vreese, ; Peter
et al., ) have taken the first steps to explaining this cross-country variation
in the representation of EU integration in their study of the effects of public
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satisfaction with democracy and of the polarization of elites’ opinions towards
the EU.
The explication of variations between countries is advanced in this study
by introducing a new variable that may account for different forms of such
debates—and that is the policy tradition of a country. Moreover, it is
acknowledged that media debates do not only differ between countries, but
also within countries if different European topics are debated. Such variations
seem likely, considering the concept of ‘issue publics’ (e.g. Kunelius & Sparks,
) as used by students of the public sphere. Scholars of policy-making have
also highlighted the importance of ‘policy domain specific subsystems’ which
are shaped by the combined impact of policy- and country-specific contexts
(Kriesi, Adam, & Jochum, ).
Since it focuses on explaining differences, this study does not seek to
analyze those factors that have been identified to explain commonalities between
and within countries. Consequently, the study does not compare issue fields
with different EU competences, nor does it differentiate between media types
or consider policy phases. Instead, it concentrates on European debates
(enlargement and constitution) in the quality press over a period of three
years (–) in Germany and France and highlights the factors that
account for differences between and within countries. This shifting of research
towards an explanation of differences facilitates the potential inherent in
comparative research within the European Union as it allows to follow the ‘most
similar system design’ (Przeworski & Teune, ). In Europeanized policy
fields, a common European input impacts on (similar) nation states. General
and issue-specific differences between these nation states can be used to explain
the variation in debates on specific topics not only between, but also within,
different countries. Such an analysis may help us to understand why a
specific European issue is debated in one country and disregarded in another
and why issues are debated differently in different countries.
In order to understand how European issues are domesticated we shall
proceed in three steps. First, the national actors and their communication
strategies are identified as crucial in shaping national media debates on Europe
as these actors may give Europe an identifiable ‘face’ and bring closeness to
the issue. The national actors’ strategic communication—we further claim—
will depend on policy traditions and issue-specific conflict constellations
within each country. Following the assumption that EU media coverage—to
some extent—responds to these national settings, expectations can be
formulated for the empirical study of the German and French debates on
EU enlargement and a common constitution. Second, the data and
methodology of the study are explained. Third, the results from a cross-
national and cross-issue press analysis are examined within the framework of
DOMESTIC ADAPTATIONS OF EUROPE 
the theoretical expectations. This examination can only increase the plausi-
bility of the arguments as content analysis data alone is not sufficient to
make causal inferences concerning the factors influencing media content.
However, it is a start (Shoemaker & Reese, , p. ).
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
NATIONAL ACTORS AND CONTEXTS
News factors influence what is reported and commented upon in the media.
News factors such as conflict, closeness, status, relevance, etc. are regarded
characteristics of events, but also as attributions by those individuals who
select events for coverage (Galtung & Ruge, ; Schulz, ). European
politics lacks these news factor determinants as compromises prevail over
conflict there, administrative regulations over personalities and unclear
responsibilities over clear-cut cleavages (Gerhards, , p. ). How then
do European topics get a ‘face’, gain relevance for national audiences and show
conflicts? It can be seen that national actors may serve as bridges between
distant European politics and national media debates because, if these
actors discuss Europe, then its news value increases (Kevin, ; Peter et al.,
; Berkel, ).
Consequently, we propose to focus on national (political) actors in order
to understand the variations in European debates between countries and also
within different countries regarding specific issue fields. For them control of
the national public arena is especially important as the national demos
determines who is going to be elected—even in European elections. As a
consequence all actors, especially those who need to win votes, shape public
debates strategically (Pan & Kosicki, ). Communication thus takes place
mindful of the possible consequences of publication (Kepplinger, ).
It follows then that national actors pursue their own interests when they
decide on their communication strategies towards Europe. The first question
then is whether national political actors have an interest in setting Europe
on the national agenda or not. Some national actors may actively engage in
setting a European issue on the national agenda, others seek to prevent topics
from reaching the agenda at all. If these national actors do put an issue on the
agenda, questions arise concerning the framing strategy employed. Framing in
this context is defined as an ideological contest over the scope of an issue, over
matters such as who is responsible and who is affected, which ideological
principles or enduring values are relevant and where the issue should be
addressed (Cobb & Elder, , Hilgartner & Bosk, ).
The most influential national actors in this respect are the national
political elites. It is less likely that outsiders of the national political process
lacking formal access to decision-making can succeed in giving prominence
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to a European issue on their own. The reason lies in the ‘principle of
cumulative inequality’ (Wolfsfeld, , p. ): those who are powerful in the
political process also have priviliged access to the media. The media
themselves can also become actors if they raise their own voices evaluating
political actors and their positions (Koopmans & Pfetsch, ). This follows
the trajectory of reasoning by political scientists and media scholars (Page,
) who argue that the media are not only a forum but also autonomous
actors in political communication. It is an open question whether the media
are able to use this role to set Europe on the agenda independently of other
national actors.
The communication strategies of national actors are bound to factors
operating within the nation state (Adam, ). Whether national actors
actively engage in setting European issues on the agenda depends on the
conflict constellation in a specific country regarding a specific issue. One factor
that is assumed to influence framing strategies of national actors is a country’s
policy tradition. Both factors will be detailed in the following.
Political actors and the public shape the conflict constellation in a specific
country regarding specific issues. For the political actors, we can distinguish
an elite and outsider variable. The degree of conflict within the political elite
is the first dimension of the conflict constellation allowing us to differentiate
polarized issues from consensual issues (Zaller, ; Kriesi, ; Peter &
De Vreese, ; Peter et al., ). The second dimension refers to the
presence or absence of outsiders of the political process who do not have
formal access to decision-making but do have the potential to mobilize opinion
(Kriesi, , p. ). As a third dimension, public opinion comes into play.
Public opinion as the aggregation of individual opinions is understood as the
distribution of individual preferences towards political objects and issues
(Converse, , p. ). Public opinion inevitably influences the actions and
strategies of those participating in the political process (for interest groups
Kollman, ; for a generalization Kriesi, ). The importance of this
factor increases if the public regards an issue as central. Also public opinion
can be either polarized or consensual. In a polarized situation differences in
opinion divide the population.
These variables allow us to distinguish between issues in which the elite
and the public agree (‘Fit’), and issues in which there is a ‘misfit’ between the
elite and the public. The latter situation also occurs in a weaker manner in
cases where an elite consensus meets a polarized public (‘weak misfit’). In
issue fields that are characterized by an elite dissent but consent in the public,
those parts of the elite that are supported by the public are strengthened. If
the elite and the public are divided one can speak of a ‘camp conflict’ in which
each camp is supported by specific segments of the population. All of these
conflict constellations can additionally be differentiated according to the
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presence or absence of outsiders within an issue field. If outsiders are present,
political actors potentially have to struggle more to control the public arena.
The different conflict constellations are summarized in Figure .
Conflict constellations are expected to affect national actors’ willingness to
discuss Europe. However, they do not relate to the manner in which national
actors put an issue on the agenda. In order to understand the differences in
the framing of EU issues we can draw on the idea of policy traditions. Policy
traditions refer to long-standing, basic values within a policy area that shape a
country’s policy-making. These policy traditions are rarely changed. They
often remain in place even if elections change the formal power structures.
Such policy traditions are intertwined with a country’s history. Risse, Cowles,
and Caporaso (, p. ) for example, highlight this factor when they show
that the domestic adaptation of Europe strongly rests on a country’s history.
They show that member states attach different meanings and connotations to
Europe and the integration process. For this article, one of the most basic
policy traditions regarding Europe is referred to: that there are countries
which emphasize the intergovernmental character of EU integration, while
others favor a supranational form of integration. This policy tradition is crucial
as it raises the question of the degree of sovereignty of national entities.
DOMESTIC ADAPTATIONS OF EUROPE
Following the assumption that EU media coverage—to some extent—responds
to these national settings, expectations can be formulated as to how specific
conflict constellations and policy traditions are reflected in debates. Two key
indicators are proposed for studying the impact of conflict constellations:
the salience of an issue and the prominence of (specific) national versus
transnational actors. The policy tradition of a country in turn is expected to be
reflected in the frames visible in a debate. To analyze frames, we focus on
responsibility attributions to different EU institutions.
FIGURE  Conflict constellations as domestic context
Elite 
Public 
 CONTRA 
(consent)
Fit Strengthening
of the pro-camp
Misfit
 Weak Misfit Camp conflict Weak misfit
Misfit Strengthening
of the contra-
camp
 Fit
present 
not present 
present 
not present 
present 
not present 
Out-siders
PRO
(consent) 
Polarized
(dissent) 
CONTRA
(consent) 
PRO
(consent) 
Polarized
(dissent)
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Different conflict constellations may yield variations in issue salience and
actor prominence. The basic assumption is that any national actors supported
by public opinion will actively engage in setting the agenda; while those
opposed by public opinion will try to avoid putting an issue on the agenda
(Gerhards, Neidhardt, & Rucht, , p. , Kollman, , pp. ff.). This
holds true for political actors in government as well as in the opposition.
Actors without direct access to political negotiations (‘outsiders’) may try to
reach out to the masses even if they are not supported by a majority, but an
important minority of citizens (Kriesi, ). These strategic aspects are
assumed to be reflected in media coverage.
In the situation of a fit between the elite and the public one can expect
national political actors to actively put an issue on the agenda as they can profit
from it. Such an issue then has a high chance of becoming salient. This salience
however, might well be accompanied by a relatively strong focus on national
actors compared to those of Europe or member states. Thus an opening towards
the issue might be combined with a closing towards transnational actors. In a
situation, however, where the elite supports what the public rejects (misfit),
national actors have no interest in setting the agenda. This is expected to lead to
the low salience of an issue. The lack of a national voice might, however, privilege
transnational actors compared to national ones. If the elite is only supported by
part of the citizens (weak misfit), government actors will try to mobilize if a topic
is important for the public. They also have the possibility of avoiding a topic if it
is unimportant for the public. The opposition however, cannot profit from
discussing this issue as they do not offer an alternative to government policies.
Consequently, national governments have higher prominence values compared to
the opposition. And as there is a national anchor, the debate may gain salience
and national actors will remain important compared to transnational actors.
A camp conflict characterized by dissent in the elite and the public is expected to
lead to debates between the pro- and contra-coalition of a country. In such
polarized situations, actors from the opposition will actively engage in setting the
agenda since they support a position different from government. Consequently,
one may expect high issue salience combined with a strong focus on national
actors in media debates. Last but not least, there is a form of conflict that
strengthens those elite actors who are supported by the public (strengthening of a
camp). They seek to set the topic on the agenda; those opposed seek to oppress it.
This situation makes it difficult to derive expectations. However, European
issues here also have a higher chance of becoming salient as they are partly
anchored with the national level, compared to situations where no national actors
have any interest in domesticating Europe.
The conflict constellation also indirectly influences the prominence of the
media as speakers, and this is reflected mainly in editorials and opinion
columns. If a specific conflict constellation invites national political actors to
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put Europe on the agenda, this topic also becomes a subject for comment by
the national media. The national anchor gives European issues a prominence
and brings them closer to the national audiences. Independent agenda-setting
of the media seems to be the exception. Whether misfit situations trigger the
media to become advocates of the citizens as they discuss Europe when the
elites seek to avoid the subject needs to be studied.
Policy traditions are expected to be reflected in the frames visible within a
debate—more exactly in the responsibility attributions to European institu-
tions. In those countries that emphasize the intergovernmental character of
EU integration, it is expected that national actors attribute more responsibility
to the EU Council, the institutional guarantor for a Europe of sovereign states,
than to the supranational institutions. By contrast, national actors tend to
stress the importance of supranational institutions in Europe when the policy
tradition refers to a supranational integration model. The impact of the
national level, however, does not stop here. It is assumed that national actors’
emphasis on specific policy traditions is also reflected if transnational actors
raise their voices in national debates. Transnational actors that attribute
responsibility in a similar way to national actors have a better chance of
passing through the selection filters of national media. The differences shown
in the framing of national actors also impact upon the overall debate.
EU coverage in this study is understood to respond—to some extent—to
events and communication strategies outside the media organization (see
for similar assumptions Peter & de Vreese, , Peter et al., ). This
assumption is supported by empirical research which shows that different
press titles within the same country argue with a similar vigor and in a similar
direction when discussing the field of EU integration in their editorials
(Pfetsch, Adam, & Berkel, ). This similarity in editorials—a format where
the press can raise their own views independently of the input—indicates that
factors within the media organization are at least not the only ones influencing
EU coverage. However, this is not to reject the notion that the individual
journalist, media routines and media organizations (see for a list of factors,
Shoemaker & Reese, ; Esser, ) also construct media depictions. As no
single study can take all of these factors into account (Shoemaker & Reese,
, p. ), this study is limited to factors outside the media organization.
In light of the lack of detailed explicative accounts regarding the domestication
of EU integration, it seems justifiable to begin by explaining country- and
issue-specific differences in debates.
METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN
METHOD
To study how national media domesticate Europe, two quality newspapers in
France and Germany were content analyzed regarding the issues of EU
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enlargement and a common constitution. The analysis is based on a
conservative (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Le Figaro) and a left-liberal
(Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung and Le Monde) newspaper in each country. The political
and economy sections were coded for the years ,  and . These
quality newspapers are not representative of the media systems in any of these
countries. Nevertheless they do allow the study of domestic adaptations.
To manage the workload the study is based on a sample of  newspaper
editions in each country, selecting one edition a week, with different rotating
schemes for the two papers in a country. As the sample for the commentary
analysis has been denser than the one for newsreporting, the commentary data
were weighted to create a common data set.
All the data are part of a larger research project called ‘Europub’
(Koopmans & Statham, ) financed by the European Commission,
which analyzed the Europeanization of public debates in seven countries.
The media’s reporting and commenting (see for the codebooks Adam et al.,
; Koopmans, ) were coded by native speakers in country teams,
which were carefully trained before coding and supervised throughout the
whole coding period. The coder trainers of the country teams were constantly
in contact to solve coding problems. Two separate reliability tests were
conducted for the project in general: one for the editorials and one for the
media’s reporting. For the former, coders in each country team coded a
random sample of seven commentaries from The Scotsman, The Times and
The Guardian of the year . The inter-coder reliabilities were measured as
the average match between the coders. The overall reliability calculated on the
core variables of the analysis turned out to be highly satisfactory with an
average match of  percent. The reliability of the coding of media reporting
was tested on the basis of one issue of The Guardian. The average match
between the coders on the core variables was  percent. As the detailed issue
delimitation turned out to be problematic, the author checked on the basis of
a string variable that captures the content of each coding unit whether it
belonged to the two issue fields under study. The reliability for specific
variables is indicated at the bottom of the respective tables or figures.
As a consequence of the focus of this study on environmental effects on
media content, the debates in the two national newspapers of a country are not
analyzed separately but are taken as indicators for a country’s debate (see for a
similar procedure Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, ). If however,
newspapers raise their own voices,1 then each one is regarded an actor
comparable to all other political actors who raise their voices.
The coding unit of the content analysis is ‘claims’. Following Koopmans
and Statham (), a claim is defined as a unit of strategic action in the
1The media act as speakers not only in their commentating, but also when they overtly take a position in
news reporting. Each commentary is regarded as one claim by a journalist.
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public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political
demands. Strategic actions refer not only to verbal statements but also to
physical actions such as decisions or court rulings. An article can contain
several claims. A claim usually consists of the following variables: (a) a
claimant—who can be a political actor or a journalist; (b) the addressees who
are held responsible or who are the targets of criticism or support; (c) the
affected actors whose interests are or would be positively (beneficiarily) or
negatively affected by the claim and (d) the topics the claim refers to.2 Claims
thus show media depictions of reality in a twofold manner. First, they make
explicit comment by journalists visible. Second, they show which other
claimants make it through the selection filter of the media.
The claims data have been analyzed on two levels: a claim-level and a level
that focuses on each single communicative relation within such claims. On a
claims-level, we can determine the salience of an issue. The number of claims
coded in each issue field within a country is taken as indicator for the
importance of the issue. Claims that deal with the relation between Europe
and the citizens, with the structures and competences of political order in the
EU or with core goals for the integration project per se are coded under
the label ‘constitutional issue’ (see for the definition European Council, ).
Enlargement claims refer to the question of who should belong under which
criteria to the Union and what are the consequences thereof. Three types of
issues can be distinguished: a low-salience issue, a ‘constant issue’ or an ‘event
jumper’. A constant issue is debated over a long period of time on a relatively
high attention level. An ‘event jumper’ is an issue that does not capture
attention in phases of routine politics, but does so at specific events and thus
binds attention cyclically. Finally a low-salience issue is characterized by a
constantly low level of reporting and comment and thus has little chance of
attracting the audience’s attention.
The prominence of (specific) national versus transnational actors and the
actors’ framing are studied by analyzing communicative relations within such
claims. On this level of analysis, each responsibility attribution from a claimant
(up to three can be coded in each claim) to an addressee (up to three can be
coded in each claim) is regarded as a unit of analysis. This perspective places
actors and their communicative relations within a specific issue at the center of
attention (see for the respective network definition Pappi, ) and thus
views debates as symbolic networks. They are symbolic in a sense that they do
not represent social relations, but communicative relations that pass through
2An example for a claim could be: ‘The European Commission criticizes the French and German
governments for not giving enough money to support the accession of Eastern European countries.’ Here
the European Commission is the claimant, both governments are coded as addressee, the Eastern European
countries are those affected, and the topic refers to enlargement.
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the filter of national media (for the symbolic dimension of politics see
Edelman, , Sarcinelli, ).
This form of analysis firstly allows us to calculate how prominent a specific
claimant is by counting the relative share the claimant has among all the
responsibility attributions within the debate. This prominence measure has
been described by network analysts as an actor’s ‘outdegree’ (Freeman, ).
Prominence in a network-analytic sense must be distinguished from traditional
analyses that define prominence as the pure visibility of actors. By contrast,
prominence here results from an actor’s communicative activity within a
network: the more communicative relations (responsibility attributions) a
claimant defines, the more prominent he is. Second, this detailed level of
analysis can reveal the framing of each claimant present in the debate. By
attributing responsibility to specific actors and institutions, a claimant defines
who is responsible to solve problems. Each claimant in this perspective can be
regarded as a frame-sponsor (Pan & Kosicki, ; Carragee & Roefs, )—
that is: someone who frames problems by defining responsibility. For each
claimant then, one can define how many of its respective communicative
relations are directed towards specific actors. This focus on each single
claimant is termed ego-centric network analysis (Wasserman & Faust, ).
Table  summarizes the case numbers of the following analysis. On the
claims-level those articles and claims are selected that refer to the analyzed
issue fields. In total, the analysis is based on  articles containing 
claims. On the level of networks and communicative relations only those
claims that contain at least one relation between claimants and addressees can
be incorporated in the analysis. This results in  articles with  claims
containing  communicative relations between claimants and addressees. As
one claim can contain, at maximum, three speakers and three addressees—and
thus up to nine relations—the case numbers of this second level of analysis
indicate the number of relations between actors.
TABLE  Case numbers
German newspapers French newspapers
Constitutional
issue
Enlargement
issue
Constitutional
issue
Enlargement
issue
Claims level
Number of articles    
Number of claims    
Network level
Number of articlesa    
Number of claimsa    
Number of relations    
aArticles and claims that contain at least one relation between speakers and addressees.
DOMESTIC ADAPTATIONS OF EUROPE 
RESEARCH DESIGN
The German and French debates on EU enlargement and a common
constitution have been chosen as they allow to follow a most similar system
design (Przeworski & Teune, ). This requires a systematic variation of the
independent variables while controlling for other differences. First, differences
are minimized as these two issues produce a common European input that hits
the nation states. In the period from  until , enlargement and a
common constitution were ‘hot’ issues in Europe: during this time the biggest
enlargement ( mostly Eastern European countries) in European history was
prepared and, in December , finally decided upon. At the same summit
the Heads of State opened the doors for negotiations with Turkey about
membership. The constitution was also at the top of the agenda: a pre-
Convention debate with summits and various heads of states proposing their
ideas on the future of Europe was followed by the work of the newly created
Constitutional Convention. Second, differences are minimized by comparing
these debates in countries that are the ‘big’ founding members of the Union,
and also regarded as engines of the European integration project.
The selection of these cases however, allows for a systematic variation
of the independent variables. The conflict constellation in the German
constitutional issue can be characterized as a ‘fit’ between the elite and the
public in support of a European Constitution. On the elite side, there is a
broad and stable consensus on European integration (Jachtenfuchs, ,
p. ). German elites traditionally support strengthening of the European
Parliament and the Commission, aiming for an economically and politically
unified federation of Europe (Maurer, ). As Eurobarometer data show, the
German population strongly supports the Constitutional project. However,
this consent fades if one looks at the possible contents of such a Constitution
(European Commission, ). As these different preferences have not yet
made their way into election results, the conflict constellation is classified as a
‘fit’. Outsiders are traditionally weak in policy fields dealing with constitu-
tional issues (Jachtenfuchs, , p. ) and thus are not expected to strongly
influence the agenda.
The conflict constellation in France with regard to the constitutional issue
can, by contrast, be described as a ‘camp conflict’. The question of European
integration deeply divides the French elites (Goulard, ; Jachtenfuchs,
, p. ). France is one of the few European countries where Europe has
created a new cleavage within the party landscape (Mittag & Wessels, ,
p. ). Parties have split over the question of European integration,
while parties at the extreme oppose it anyway. The main parties today are also
3The ‘Mouvement pour la France’ was founded as a Euro-skeptic split-off from the UDF (); the
‘Mouvement de Citoyens’ as a split-off from the socialists (); the ‘Rassemblement pour la France’ as a
split-off from the RPR ().
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internally divided over the question of European integration (Mu¨ller-
Brandeck-Bocquet, , p. ). The French citizens, on the other hand,
support the project of a European Constitution in general but are—like the
Germans—divided on specific contents (European Commission, ), but
show this divide—in contrast to the Germans—in their voting behavior. In
the European elections of , and also in the national ones of , euro-
sceptic parties won more than  percent of the votes (Goulard, ;
Ziebura, ). As there are only few EU-specific groups (e.g. ‘CAFECES’ or
‘Mouvement europe´enne’) and civil society organizations are traditionally weak
in French politics, a strong role for outsiders is not expected in this policy
field.
The German dispute on enlargement in general can be characterized as a
‘weak misfit’ between the elite and the public. Where Turkey is concerned,
the conflict constellation strengthens the contra camp. The German elite
strongly supports Eastern enlargement of the European Union (Mu¨ller-
Brandeck-Bocquet, ). Over Turkey, however, the elite is divided: the
governing coalition of social democrats and greens (–) has paved the
way for membership negotiations with Turkey, which the conservatives reject.
German citizens are also divided on the question as to whether the ten new
members should join the Union (European Commission, ). When it
comes to Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria they deeply reject enlargement.
As the enlargement issue stretches over a variety of issue fields, it is expected
that outsiders (agricultural organizations, unions, etc.) will become more
strongly involved compared to any constitutional issue.
A misfit between the elite and the public characterizes French politics on
EU enlargement in the period between  and . In the s the French
elites tried to prevent enlargement (Froehly, , p. ). But, as the
enlargement process was already on track, the French elite—hesitantly—
supported it. By contrast French citizens reject all possible enlargement
processes by a large majority (European Commission, ). The French
rejection is the strongest in all Europe (Ziebura, , p. ). As enlargement
is such a broad issue field, it can be expected that outsiders mobilize in
their respective areas (agricultural organizations, etc.). Table  summarizes
the conflict constellations regarding the two issue fields in Germany and
France.
Turning to the policy traditions, the two countries differ fundamentally.
Traditionally, Germany as a result of its history supports a supranational
model of EU integration (see e.g. Maurer, ). After the Second World
War, Germany was isolated and the ‘national model’ had a negative image.
France, by contrast, has always been the ‘nation state par excellence’ (Ziebura,
, p. ) since the French Revolution, defending national sovereignty in
Europe. This consensus on an intergovernmental Europe has faded in the last
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years, but compared to Germany those calling for an intergovernmental
Europe are still strong.
RESULTS
ISSUE SALIENCE
Figure  shows that the salience of the German and French debates on EU
enlargement and a common constitution differs. This analysis is based on the
number of claims made visible in the press in the course of time. It shows that
the French debate on EU enlargement can be characterized as a ‘low-salience
issue’, whereas the constitutional issues in both countries seem to be classical
‘event jumpers’. Only the enlargement issue in Germany comes close to what
has been called a ‘constant issue’ (Figure ).
What is striking is the extreme parallelism of the German and French
debates on a European Constitution. In both countries, reporting and
commentating follow the same events (see for a detailed analysis Adam,
). By contrast, debates on enlargement differ drastically between Germany
and France. In France, enlargement becomes an issue only at the end of the
year . This is the time when negotiations are finished and the heads of
states finally decide on the biggest enlargement in the history of the EU and
on the possibility of the accession of Turkey. Before that time enlargement
was not an issue on the French agenda. In Germany, enlargement questions
were debated throughout the whole three-year period triggered by different
events and topics.
These results meet our expectations. In situations where the conflict
constellation makes it unattractive for the national political elite to put an EU
issue on the agenda, the issue is likely to remain below a specific threshold
TABLE  Conflict constellations in Germany and France
Opinion of the political elite
Public opinion Pro (Consent) Polarized (Dissent) Contra (Consent)
Pro (Consent) Constitutional
issue in Germany
Polarized (Dissent) Enlargement issue
in Germany
Constitutional issue
in France
Contra (Consent) Enlargement issue
in France
(Enlargement issue
in Germany with
regardtoTurkey)
Note: Shading indicates the presence of outsiders is expected for this issue.
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and thus to become a low-salience issue.4 Such a conflict constellation exists
regarding the issue of EU enlargement in France. The misfit between the elite
and the public makes it unattractive for national elites to discuss the topic.
Consequently, the issue lacks a national anchor, which is reflected in the low
salience of the issue in the press. The national issue-specific conflict
constellations thus seem to have an impact on the salience of EU issues.
However, this factor needs further refinement as it cannot explain why a topic
becomes an event-jumper or a constant issue. Additionally, this factor needs to
be tested in more cases.
ACTORS’ PROMINENCE
Table  shows how prominent a specific category of claimants is by counting
the relative share it has on all responsibility attributions in a debate. The
results show clearly that national claimants strongly shape the constitutional
debates and the enlargement debate in Germany. Here the national actors’
share on all responsibility attributions amount to –. percent. In the
French enlargement debate the national speakers’ share amounts to  percent
(Table ).
These results meet our expectations. In the French enlargement debate
where one expected national elites to avoid the issue, national claimants were
not prominent at all in the press debates. Only  percent of all responsibility
FIGURE  Importance of public debates in the course of time
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Basis: coded claims in four newspapers (‘SZ’, ‘FAZ’, ‘Le Monde’, ‘Le Figaro’), reporting and
commentating. Reliability match of news analysis: news article selection  percent; claims selection within
news articles  percent; broad issue field (issue //):  percent/ percent/ percent detailed issue
field coding was done by the author on the basis of a string variable. Reliability match of commentary
analysis: Selection of commentaries has not been tested as commentaries are defined in a strict sense as the
opinion articles of a journalist or editor and appear every day in a specific layout. Claims selection within
commentaries  percent (per definition each commentary contains at maximum one claim); broad issue
field (issue//):  percent/ percent/ percent; detailed issue field coding was done by the author on
the basis of a string variable.
4Whether the French enlargement debate can already be called a ‘low-salience issue’ depends on the
criteria one uses. A comparison on the basis of absolute numbers cannot say anything about the importance
of an issue on the overall agenda. Nevertheless such a comparison allows the evaluation of how much is
actually reported and thus how likely it is that the audience notices the issue.
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attributions are made by national actors. In total this equals  responsibility
attributions in a three-year period. On average, French national actors become
visible with one responsibility attribution in every forth newspaper edition.
By comparison the national actors in the German enlargement debate are
responsible for , in the German constitutional debate for , and in the
French constitutional debate for  responsibility attributions.
A closer look also reveals a correspondence between the conflict
constellation and the prominence of the established actors. The national
governments, for example, are responsible for around – percent of all
communicative relations. Only in the debate characterized by a strong misfit
between the attitudes of the elites and the citizens does the government
become silent compared to the other actors: in the French debate on EU
enlargement, the national government is responsible for less than  percent of
all communicative relations. The left-leaning government under Jospin
generally avoided talking about the issue. As expected the legislative body,
where opposition parties have a strong voice, is a less important claimant in
TABLE  Prominence of claimants
Constitutional issue Enlargement issue
Germany
(n¼ )
Percent
France
(n¼ )
Percent
Germany
(n¼ ,)
Percent
France
(n¼ )
Percent
National claimants . . . .
Established
political actors
. . . .
Executive . . . .
Right . .
Left . .
Legislative and
political parties
. . . .
Right . . . .
Left . . . .
EU-opponents – . – .
Civil society . . . .
Media . . . .
Right . . . .
Left . . . .
Transnational claimants . . . .
Total . . . .
Note: The general categories contain more cases than the sub-categories as not all cases can be assigned to a
sub-category.
Basis: all communicative relations.
Reliability match of news analysis: claimant // (function)¼  percent/ percent/ percent; claimant
// (scope)¼  percent/ percent/ percent.
Reliability match of commentary analysis: Claimant is per definition the journalist writing the commentary.
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the enlargement debates compared to the constitutional ones because in the
former it supports the position of the government which the public (partly)
rejects and thus cannot profit from an intensified debate. In both countries,
the share of responsibility attributions made by the legislative on enlargement
is about half the share of these attributions by the legislative on the
constitution. Also, in France, parties that oppose EU integration do not put
the enlargement issue on the national agenda.
Interestingly, national civil society organizations are not prominent in any
of these debates. In three out of four debates their share is marginal. Only in
the French debate on a European constitution are they responsible for about
 percent of all communicative relations. We expected them to be more
prominent in the enlargement rather than in the constitutional issue as here
their interests are concretely affected. Whether civil society lacks prominence
because of missing communication strategies geared at the public or whether
civil society organizations fail to get through the filter of the national media
cannot be evaluated within this particular research design. Whatever the
reason, the lack of civil society organizations in disputes on EU integration
(see for the same results on a broader data base Koopmans, , p. )
privileges national elites as they are the only ones who can give Europe a face
and bring it closer to the citizens. The national elites however, strategically
decide whether they give Europe a national anchor or not.
Last but not least, there are the media who become claimants themselves if
they raise their voices. Here we find substantial differences between the
countries. The media are more prominent in German than in French debates.
This can be explained to some extent by different formats: the analyzed
German newspapers publish – editorials daily whereas there is only one in
each French newspaper. The crucial question concerning the media is whether
they follow the national anchor and remain silent in the situation of a misfit,
in which national politicians attempt to avoid the issue. As the relative
prominence of the media as claimants within a country varies little, one can
conclude that the media do not succeed in making up for the missing voice of
national politicians by raising their own voice more prominently.
ACTORS’ RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS EU INSTITUTIONS
Table  shows to which EU institutions national and transnational claimants
attribute responsibility for solving problems. This analysis is based on all
responsibility attributions that are directed towards European institutions.
These results also highlight the fact that European issues are domesticated and
that this domestication is impacted by national conditions. In Germany,
a country with a strong supranational policy tradition in EU politics, national
actors in both debates attribute around  percent of all responsibility
attributions towards the EU to the supranational institutions (Commission,
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Parliament, Conventions). The intergovernmental EU Council, by compar-
ison, has only a share of between  and  percent. In France however,
national claimants, when referring to the EU, call roughly equally for
problem-solving of supranational institutions (around  percent) and
intergovernmental ones (between  and  percent). This debate thus
seems to correspond with the French policy tradition: a traditional focus on
intergovernmental integration has been replaced by a struggle as to how
integration should proceed.
Interestingly, Table  shows that transnational actors who appear as
claimants in the national press attribute responsibility in a similar way as the
respective national claimants. National policy traditions thus do not only shape
national actors’ framing but also the framing of transnational speakers in the
debate. The strong supranational focus of national claimants in the German
constitutional debate is topped by an even stronger supranational focus of
TABLE  Responsibility attributions towards EU institutions
Supranational institutions: Inter-
governmental
institution:
EU Council
EU in
general
Other N
Commission,
Parliament
Conventions
Constitutional issue
Germany
National claimants . . . . . 
Transnational
claimants
. . . . . 
France
National claimants . . . . . 
Transnational
claimants
. . . . . 
Enlargement issue
Germany
National claimants . . . . . 
Transnational
claimants
. . . . . 
France
National claimants . . . . . 
Transnational
claimants
. . . . . 
Basis: all responsibility attributions that are directed at the EU; row-wise percentages.
Reading example: National claimants in the German constitutional debate direct . percent of all their
responsibility attributions to the EU to the Commission and the Parliament.
Reliability match of news analysis: claimant // (scope)¼  percent/ percent/ percent; addressee
// (EU Institution)¼  percent/ percent/ percent.
Reliability match of commentary analysis: claimant is per definition the journalist writing the commentary;
addressee // (EU Institution)¼  percent/ percent/ percent.
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transnational claimants (around  percent). The same holds for the lack of
attention to the EU Council. Transnational actors in France, by contrast,
bring in a strong intergovernmental focus (. percent), which resembles the
national actors’ framing. Similar patterns can be observed in the enlargement
debates.
Whether there is a relation between national actors’ responsibility
attributions towards the EU and transnational actors’ responsibility attribu-
tions, can be tested with regression analysis. With these analyzes we seek to
predict, on the basis of national actors’ responsibility attributions, how
transnational actors depicted in the media would frame the same issue. This
modeling results in high, statistically significant relations between national
actors’ and transnational actors’ responsibility attributions towards the EU as
depicted in the press (Table ). The domestication of Europe is thus first the
result of national actors’ framing. This framing however, impacts on how the
overall debate is structured. Transnational speakers who appear in the national
media do not thus necessarily make debates more similar between different
countries.
CONCLUSION
So far, research that seeks to explain debates on EU integration has focused on
factors that help understanding commonalities in the reporting and
commentating on issues across Europe. Issues that produce a European
TABLE  National claimants’ responsibility attributions as shapers of
transnational claimants’ responsibility attributions (Regression analysis)
Adj.
R
Sign.  N (relations): Attributions
to EU
N
(actors)
National
actors
Transnational
actors
Constitution Germany . . .   
Constitution France . . .   
Enlargement Germany . . .   
Enlargement France . . .   
Basis: All responsibility attributions that point from national or transnational claimants to the EU. The EU
is differentiated into seven actor categories: Commission, Parliament, Convention on Human Rights,
Constitutional Convention, Council, EU in general and other EU actors.
Calculation: Regression analysis wtih national actors’ responsibility attributions towards the EU as
independent variable and transnational actors’ responsibility attributions towards the EU as dependent
variable. Program: UCINET 
Note: The level of significance is determined by comparing the actual results of the analysis with results of a
high number of regressions in which the values of the dependent variable have been randomly permuted.
This procedure allows to calculate regressions for variables that are not independent and thus violate the
classical assumption of statistical analysis. Network indicators are per definition not independent of each
other.
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input as competences have been shifted to EU levels, and specific European
events and conflicts that alter routine politics in the Union have been
identified as factors that open national debates. Acknowledging the importance
of these factors, this article has made an attempt to understand when and how
a specific European issue is debated in one country and disregarded or debated
differently in another. A common European input enters the nation states but
then experiences a ‘domestic adaptation with national colors’ (Risse et al.,
, p. ).
To understand these domestic adaptation processes, national actors and
contexts have been identified as shaping factors. The willingness of national
actors’ to actively discuss Europe was seen to be connected to the conflict
constellation and their framing of issues to a country’s policy tradition. The
analysis of the issue salience, the prominence of claimants and their
responsibility attributions towards EU institutions in the German and
French press debates on EU enlargement and a common constitution
indicates the relevance of these factors. It seems that the issue-specific conflict
constellation in a country affects the salience of an issue and actors’ prominence
in the press. For the national elites themselves it is a strategic decision as to
whether to actively engage in putting a European issue on the agenda or to
avoid it. This is reflected in the press debates: those national elites who cannot
profit from discussing a European topic have a lower share of the overall
prominence as claimants than those whose interests are served by putting
Europe on the agenda. So far outsiders hardly challenge the elites’ strategic
game in putting Europe on the agenda. And the media, when raising their own
voice, do not push an issue onto the agenda on their own when it lacks
national attention. Consequently, it is the national political actors who
domesticate Europe. If, however, they cannot profit from such domestication,
an issue will probably become a low-salience issue—as can be seen in the
French enlargement debate. Thus Europe gains news value if national speakers
participate in the game. Also policy traditions are reflected in the debates: while
supranational EU institutions dominate the German debates, a stronger focus
on an intergovernmental Europe is found in France. Interestingly, the policy
traditions are not only reflected in national actors’ framing but in the overall
debate. This indicates that those transnational actors who use similar frames as
national actors do have a better chance of passing through the selection filters
of the national media.
The study shows clearly that the common EU input is filtered at the
national level. To further understand how European issues are domesticated,
one needs to test the proposed factors on a broader basis and make
the underlying mechanism manifest by validating them with external data. To
do that it is necessary to take account not only of general country differences
but also of issue-specific constellations within each country. Comparisons thus
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need to be cross-national and cross-issue to understand ‘domestic adaptations
with national colors’ (Risse et al., , p. ).
As a consequence of the filtering at the national level, the European
communicative space has as many faces as countries. As debates on Europe are
regarded a precondition for democratization of the European Union, there is
a need to answer the question of whether, and how, the plurality of debates
on European issues might foster legitimacy and integration. It is clear that
integration by public communication cannot mean homogenization, but—if at
all—calls for integration in plurality. This form of integration allows that
debates on EU issues will differ between countries if they reflect the
dependency of the European Union without walling off the own nation state
(Adam, ).
The results also yield cautious—as based on only four test cases—
implications for the political process in the European Union. This process,
which has taken place behind closed doors for the last decades, has the
opportunity to be confronted with public debates if national politicians foster
that. If, however, they do not put Europe on the agenda, other national or
transnational actors will have a difficult time compensating for their failure.
Consequently, public debates have also not freed themselves from the elitist
character of EU integration. In addition the analysis has shown that if Europe
becomes public, factors engrained in the nation state—like policy traditions—
are deeply reflected within the national depictions of EU integration.
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